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NO. 19 APRIL 2018 Introduction 
The EU as a Force for Peace in 
International Cyber Diplomacy 
Annegret Bendiek 
Ever since the cyber attacks against the computer networks of European govern-
ments and defence and foreign ministries have become public knowledge, security 
policy-makers have insisted that the EU Member States need to develop more ad-
equate cyber-defence and cyber-retaliation capabilities. However, the EU continues 
to base its cyber-security strategy on the resilience of Information and Communica-
tion Technology Infrastructures and cyber diplomacy as part of its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) so as to position itself as a force for peace. Its Joint EU 
Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities, adopted in October 2017, pri-
marily stipulates non-military instruments that could contribute to “the mitigation 
of cybersecurity threats, conflict prevention and greater stability in international 
relations”. Faced with increasing activities infrastructures, Europe would be well-
advised to adhere to the step-by-step cyber-diplomacy plan, which is based on the 
principle of due diligence. 
 
Cyber attacks, such as against the informa-
tion and telecommunications infrastructure 
of the German federal government, cyber-
espionage, intellectual property theft, 
cybercrime or disinformation not only para-
lyse single communication and cybersecu-
rity policies, they can also constitute part of 
hybrid warfare. “Hybrid” here means the 
deliberate covert or overt use of civilian and 
military instruments by state or non-state 
actors. Alongside cyber attacks, these in-
clude disinformation campaigns, espionage, 
economic pressure, the use of proxy forces 
and other subversive activities. Therefore, 
after the nerve-gas attack in London, EU 
heads of government and state declared 
their unequivocal solidarity with the United 
Kingdom in late March 2018 and threatened 
Russia with consequences. Further sanctions 
are being considered, as is digital retaliation 
(hackback). 
Cyber Defence: 
Defensive or Offensive? 
It is a politically and legally controversial 
issue whether attacked states should adopt 
offensive countermeasures, such as hack-
backs, to neutralise the source of a cyber-
attack. Germany’s 2016 Cyber Security 
Strategy pledged the need for defensive 
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cyber security and calls for the creation of a 
mobile Quick Reaction Force housed within 
the Federal Office for Information Security 
(BSI), as well as similar teams within the 
federal police and domestic intelligence 
agency that are able to respond to cyber 
threats against government institutions and 
critical infrastructure. The new coalition 
government takes the stance that the state 
requires military and strategic cyber weap-
ons as well as a legal basis for their deploy-
ment in order to respond to cyber attacks, 
such as on the federal parliament in 2015 
or the government network in 2016. 
NATO categorises attacks in cyberspace 
as a form of warfare, which can trigger the 
mutual defence clause under Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO is currently 
debating whether offensive computer-
network operations by its member states 
should be a component of its operational 
planning. Since the 2016 NATO Summit in 
Warsaw, NATO-EU cooperation has been 
strengthened through the exchange of 
information and joint cyber-security exer-
cises. In its 2016 Paper on German Security 
Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 
the German federal defence ministry 
extended this development and created a 
sixth organisational unit for its military – 
the cyberspace and information space unit – 
which currently has approximately 13,500 
staff. In the case of self-defence or mutual 
defence within NATO, both defensive and 
offensive cyber-defence capabilities may be 
used. Whether this holds true for offensive 
capabilities in peacetime is contentious. 
Critics argue that the proliferation of mal-
ware for cyber-attacks does not justify the 
short-term advantages generated by the 
supposedly greater potential for deterrence 
which these capabilities offer. They insist 
that confidence and security-building meas-
ures as well as arms control must be led by 
the United Nations (UN) and OSCE, and that 
any development of offensive cyber-defence 
capabilities risks fuelling mistrust, mutual 
insecurity and conflicts. They believe that 
only a long-term cyber diplomacy coordi-
nated at the European level could help to 
bring about security in Europe and avoid 
conflict escalation. Self-evidently, it is in 
the EU’s own interests to position itself as a 
force for peace in cyber security and to em-
phasise compromise and communication. 
Cyber-Diplomacy Formats 
Cyber diplomacy – as opposed to overall 
cyber defence – offers the potential for 
conflict de-escalation and thus for develop-
ing a force for peace. More than 30 states 
now have commissioners for cyber foreign 
policy. Denmark has even appointed a 
cyber-diplomacy ambassador. Cyber diplo-
macy in the widest sense encompasses con-
fidence-building measures (CBMs). It also 
comprises certain aspects of international 
norm building, data protection and free-
dom of expression, Internet Governance, 
and prosecution under international agree-
ments for mutual legal assistance. Many 
governments, however, have neither the 
knowledge nor the necessary resources to 
maintain basic cyber-security standards or 
even ascertain what attacks are being con-
ducted via servers on their territory. Never-
theless, most states voice profound reser-
vations over national sovereignty when 
presented with the idea of a central global 
regulatory body for security in cyberspace, 
thereby rendering it an unrealistic prospect 
for the time being. It is more likely that 
cyberspace and information space will be 
increasingly subject to national sovereignty. 
On the multilateral level, in 2015 a 
group of 25 international government 
experts commissioned by the UN General 
Assembly reached a consensus that inter-
national law should be applied in cyber-
space as well, including the right to self-
defence. However, in summer 2017 the 
group could not agree on whether to estab-
lish a so-called attribution council. As a 
precondition for attribution – meaning 
the technical, legal and political identifi-
cation of the perpetrator of a cyber attack 
– sensitive information must be exchanged 
among Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs) and between secret services 
and security agencies. 
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Due to ineffective multilateral formats, 
in 2016 presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir 
Putin signed a bilateral joint declaration 
in Shanghai announcing a new phase in 
the comprehensive strategic partnership 
between China and Russia. Beijing and 
Moscow voiced their concern that infor-
mation and telecommunications technolo-
gies were being misused for interference in 
internal affairs. The international commu-
nity, they stated, should cooperate on the 
basis of mutual respect and expediency as 
well as justice, and provide joint responses 
to threats to information security. The US 
also relies on bilateral agreements, for in-
stance with China, to fight cybercrime. 
Ever since multilateral negotiations at 
the UN level failed in 2017, cyber-security 
experts have been calling for “coalitions of 
the willing” from G20 or G7 states to drive 
international norm-setting forward. Two-
track formats, such as the Global Commis-
sion on the Stability of Cyberspace, pre-
dominate. However, strengthening attribu-
tion concerns not only states but also the 
private sector. In February 2017 Microsoft 
called for a “Digital Geneva Convention”. 
The most recent initiative, a “Charter of 
Trust” launched by Siemens at the Munich 
Security Conference in February 2018, sets 
the same course. Finally, the World Eco-
nomic Forum aims to create a Global Centre 
for Cybersecurity to combat cybercrime and 
thus also improve cooperation between the 
private sector and state authorities, the so-
called public-private partnerships. 
The EU’s Cyber-Foreign and Cyber-
Security Policy 
Cyber security is an issue not only for states 
but for the EU as well. It extends beyond 
the resilience of networks, the digital single 
market or the prosecution of cyber crimi-
nals, and also concerns the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
(see table on next page). A range of actors 
already tackle cyber-foreign and cyber-
security policy within the EU’s Integrated 
Political Crises Response (IPCR): most sig-
nificantly, the EU Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA); the European 
Cybercrime Centre (EC3) at Europol; the EU 
Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN); 
the Intelligence Directorate of the EU Mili-
tary Staff (EUMS INT) and its situation room 
(SITROOM); the INTCEN unit for analysing 
hybrid threats, known as the Hybrid Fusion 
Cell; the Computer Emergency Response 
Team for EU institutions and agencies 
(CERT-EU); and the European Commission’s 
Emergency Response Coordination Centre 
(ERCC). New structures and mechanisms 
created under the Network and Information 
Security (NIS) directive, such as the member 
states’ network of IT emergency teams 
(CSIRTs), must also be acknowledged. 
At the EU level, the Horizontal Working 
Party on Cyber Issues was created in 2015 
to coordinate the political aspects of cyber-
space within the Council. It can participate 
in both legislative and non-legislative 
activities. Furthermore, EU member states 
decided in February 2015 to strengthen 
cyber diplomacy at the EU level in the Euro-
pean External Action Service (EEAS). This 
was confirmed in November 2016 by the 
implementation plan on security and de-
fence. Important bodies that coordinate the 
strategic upstream analysis for the CFSP are 
the cyber diplomacy team in the EEAS as 
well as EU INTCEN for civilian situational 
awareness and EUMS INT for the military. 
To deter and reconstruct cyber attacks, and 
identify the perpetrators, forensic computer 
scientists depend on numerous sources in 
different states and companies on all politi-
cal levels. To establish coordination in this 
area, the EU can rely on well-established 
cooperation between ministries and secu-
rity agencies. Special rules apply for the 
fight against terrorism. However, an EU-
coordinated policy that brings together 
binding exchanges of information with sur-
veillance and the use of that shared infor-
mation has not yet been enshrined as an 
EU competence in the treaties but is subject 
for reconsideration. The EU’s Joint Commu-
nication on “Resilience, Deterrence and De-
fence: Building Strong Cybersecurity for the 
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EU” of September 2017 offers starting-
points for cooperation that builds both 
confidence and security and is based on the 
four pillars of EU cyber security (see table). 
The Horizontal Working Party on Cyber 
Issues, chaired by the rotating Presidency, 
and the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) are responsible for appropriate imple-
mentation measures. Legally Member States 
are free to launch initiatives. 
First pillar: The provisions of the Directive 
on Attacks against Information Systems of 
2013 including its penalties are applicable 
in the case of criminal actors without sig-
nificant ties to a State sponsor. To counter 
the growing threat of cross-border cyber-
crime, new instruments are planned that 
can be used to prosecute perpetrators more 
effectively. An “e-evidence” directive is cur-
rently being negotiated to facilitate cross-
border access to electronic evidence. Also 
under discussion is a directive on fighting 
fraud and forgery in cashless media, such as 
bitcoin. This aims to improve cooperation 
between criminal-justice authorities. 
Second pillar: ENISA is being upgraded, 
having increased its staff from around 80 
to 125 and its annual budget from 11 to 23 
million euros. The agency is expected to 
organise yearly pan-European cyber-secu-
rity exercises and steer cooperation between 
the member states’ Computer Security In-
cident Response Teams (CSIRTs). Previously, 
these exercises were occasionally extended 
to allied non-member states. ENISA is pri-
marily meant to accompany the establish-
ment and implementation of an EU-wide 
certification framework. The objective is to 
make IT products and services more secure 
through market incentives and to enable 
users to make informed purchasing deci-
sions. Divergent certification systems will 
be harmonised to strengthen the digital 
single market for trustworthy products. 
These measures are based on the Network 
and Information Security (NIS) directive, 
which will come into force in May 2018; it 
serves as a benchmark for attaining similar 
improvements in the OSCE as well. 
Third pillar: In December 2017 the EU’s 
25 defence ministers established Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Two of 
its 17 projects are explicitly dedicated to 
Europe’s cyber security. According to re-
ports, others concern the standardisation 
of soldier systems – meaning electronic 
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equipment, linguistic and data communica-
tions, and software. Greece plans to develop 
a European IT emergency team; Lithuania 
wants to be in charge of establishing a Euro-
pean cyber defence. The idea is to create 
a “cyber Schengen area” so as to combat on-
line criminality operating across all national 
borders. By late 2020 the European Invest-
ment Bank intends to invest more than 
6 billion euros in developing so-called dual-
use technologies for cyber security and 
civilian security. 
Fourth pillar: The EU is conducting bi-
lateral cyber dialogues within its strategic 
partnership agreements with USA, Canada, 
China, South Korea etc. The EU also pro-
poses drawing up a strategy for inter-
national cooperation in cyberspace and 
conflict prevention, in line with the cyber-
security reform of September 2017. As a 
first step, it has updated the CFSP and 
CDSP’s instruments as well as its directive 
on export controls for dual-use goods. 
Joint EU Diplomatic Response to 
Malicious Cyber Activities 
The increase in cyber attacks has forced 
international actors to consider how to 
respond appropriately. The Obama ad-
ministration imposed unilateral sanctions 
for the first time in 2014 after a US sub-
sidiary of the Sony Corporation fell victim 
to a devastating cyber attack, during which 
all company data were copied. Two years 
later, Washington reacted similarly when 
the US administration’s personnel data 
were siphoned during a large-scale cyber 
attack. Following the alleged Russian inter-
ference in the 2016 US presidential election 
campaign, the US government imposed 
sanctions in March 2018 on five companies 
and organisations as well as 19 individuals, 
citing Russia’s “malicious cyber activities”. 
The EU had first discussed the necessity for 
joint cyber diplomacy in February 2015. In 
June 2017, it suggested establishing a Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox so as give the EU a joint 
diplomatic response to malicious cyber 
activities. Its main goal was to guarantee 
the responsiveness of its foreign and secu-
rity policy below the threshold for armed 
conflict. This would complement its efforts 
under the NIS directive to push through 
minimum standards and reporting obli-
gations as well as build resilient IT and 
communications systems in the digital 
single market. At the EU level, responding 
to attacks with cyber diplomacy above trig-
gers the political measures contained in 
the CFSP, including restrictive measures. In 
October 2017, the planned Cyber Diploma-
cy Toolbox was adopted under its new title 
of Draft implementing guidelines for the 
Framework on a Joint EU Diplomatic Re-
sponse to Malicious Cyber Activities. Its pur-
pose is to facilitate cooperation in contain-
ing immediate and long-term threats and to 
help deter culprits and potential attackers 
in the long term. Individual states appar-
ently did not have sufficient reach to im-
pact on attackers’ cost-benefit calculations; 
EU diplomacy, by contrast, offered a stra-
tegic added value due to its ability to im-
pose sanctions or positive incentives. The 
EU has committed to international prin-
ciples upholding due diligence in cyber-
space and intends to strengthen cyber diplo-
macy in exchanges with third parties with 
the aim of combating cyber attacks. The 
UN’s Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 
incorporated the principle of upholding 
due diligence in its final report of June 
2015. According to this report, states should 
ascertain that their sovereign territory, and 
the computer systems and infrastructure 
located there or otherwise under their con-
trol, are not misused for attacks on the 
infrastructure of other states. 
Five Categories of Measures 
In its cyber diplomacy, the EU relies on the 
CFSP toolbox. Its measures can be divided 
into preventative, cooperative, stabilising 
and restrictive, as well as member states’ 
lawful responses for self-defence. Political 
measures are agreed in the EU Council with 
the assistance of the European External 
Action Service. In grave instances, mali-
cious cyber activities could amount to 
SWP Comment 19 
April 2018 
6 
punitive measures and the use of force or 
an armed attack in accordance with inter-
national law and the Charter of the United 
Nations. In this case, member states take a 
sovereign decision to exercise individual or 
collective self-defence as recognised in Ar-
ticle 51 of the UN Charter and in accord-
ance with international and humanitarian 
law. 
Prevention: Within the EU’s political dia-
logues with third states, it has developed 
cyber dialogues that aim to influence the 
behaviour and attitude of its dialogue part-
ners. The EU also supports confidence-
building measures (CBMs) such as those 
developed by the OSCE. Dialogues with 
regional organisations such as the African 
Union or ASEAN are particularly important. 
The EU and the respective regional body 
can define how to build up the region’s 
capacities for using cyberspace (known as 
“cyber capacity building”) in association, 
partnership or cooperation agreements, or 
even through the Instrument contributing 
to Stability and Peace (IcSP). 
Cooperation: To facilitate an ongoing in-
cident, an EU delegation in a host country 
can transmit a diplomatic note (démarche) 
to that country’s government. This requires 
an instruction from the High Representa-
tive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. In a conflict situation, the 
delegation head can deliver a proposal to 
conduct comprehensive talks or merely 
convey key messages. Démarches can also 
be formulated and delivered together with 
third states. Where the EU delegation head 
has been recalled due to conflict, this type 
of cooperative solution is no longer pos-
sible. 
Stability: These measures have a signal-
ling function by serving as a strategic com-
munication that the potential aggressor 
should refrain from engaging in malicious 
cyber activities The European Council can 
set out an EU act or position, but only 
unanimously. It can also pass a resolution 
to implement such an act. In that case, 
qualified-majority voting applies, except 
for acts of implementation concerning the 
military or defence (art 31 para 2 TEU). The 
High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy can also 
make a declaration “in the name of the 
EU”. However, this has to be agreed before-
hand with all EU states and is usually em-
ployed if there is no need for an immediate 
response, if the EU first has to work out its 
position vis-à-vis a new situation, or if it has 
modified an established position. However, 
the High Representative can also make a 
declaration under her own responsibility 
if a quick reaction is required but it is not 
possible to seek agreement from the EU 27. 
Sanctions: The EU can impose restrictive 
measures (sanctions) if it intends to push 
through political objectives following 
serious cyber attacks. These measures tend 
to target government officials of third 
states, but also state companies or other 
legal or natural persons. Sanctions have to 
be voted unanimously in the Council and 
must conform to the CFSP’s objectives 
under art 24 TEU. Sanctions can be divided 
itno two main categories: those decided 
autonomously by the EU and those that the 
EU is obliged to impose following a 
resolution by the United Nations Security 
Council. Under EU law, sanctions must be 
targeted. For instance, specific persons or 
companies may be put on a sanctions list in 
order to block their bank accounts as long 
as minimum rule-of-law standards are met. 
So-called prerequisites for legality have 
been drawn up for such cases, which stipu-
late, for example, that those targeted have 
to be informed of the reasons for being 
listed and be given the opportunity to file 
a complaint. 
Possible EU support to Member States’ lawful 
respsonses: The Lisbon Treaty introduced the 
solidarity and mutual-assistance clauses, 
which can be invoked after severe cyber 
attacks. The solidarity clause (art 222 TFEU) 
stipulates that EU member states provide 
mutual support if one or several of them 
are victims of terror attacks, natural dis-
asters or man-made disasters (including 
serious cyber incidents). Its implementation 
procedure was defined by Council decision 
in July 2014. The mutual-assistance clause 
contained in art 42 para 7 TEU roughly 
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corresponds to Article 5 of the NATO 
Treaty, although the latter takes precedence 
for NATO members. The mutual-assistance 
clause was invoked for the first time in 
November 2015 by France following the 
Paris terror attacks. Under the Joint EU 
Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber 
Activities of October 2017, responses that 
are compliant with international law do 
not require unequivocal attribution of 
cyber attacks to specific origins or perpetra-
tors. This accords with the interpretations 
of international law experts enshrined in 
the Tallin 2 manual on how international 
law applies to cyberspace. 
Export Controls 
The EU intends to promote its cyber 
diplomacy and aspiration to due diligence 
by controlling the export of dual-use goods 
more strictly. The dual-use directive of May 
2009 regulates the member states’ joint 
licensing requirements for the export, pro-
curement and transit of such goods. In mid-
December 2017, the European Commission 
published a new version of the directive’s 
annexes I, IIa to IIg and IV. The update 
mainly concerned new controls for certain 
goods, such as IT hardware. Goods are cat-
egorised as subject to control (annex I) 
based on a) the stipulations of international 
treaties and obligations, especially UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1540, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and the Biological 
Weapons Convention, and b) the control 
lists of international multilateral export 
regimes, above all the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 
Australia Group and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR). These lists in par-
ticular are constantly modified. Not only is 
the export of specific goods to states under 
sanction subject to tighter controls, but in 
many cases separate approval also has to be 
obtained for exporting dual-use goods. Non-
compliance can result in stiff penalties or 
fines. 
Due Diligence, Step by Step 
The EU’s unanimity requirement makes 
positioning it as a force for peace difficult. 
Its member states not only display great 
strategic ambivalence, for instance in their 
policy towards Russia, but their actions in 
foreign affairs also lack coherence. The 
EU’s aspiration to act as a force for peace 
is shown by member states seeking to 
strengthen the due-diligence principle via 
the CFSP’s political instruments. Due dili-
gence is a well-accepted principle in inter-
national law based on the idea that the EU 
not only has to guarantee that rules are up-
held in its own jurisdiction, but also needs 
to bear responsibility for the consequences 
of its actions beyond its borders, for in-
stance through a stricter export policy. Ever 
more frequently, EU decisions reach beyond 
its jurisdiction. It is the EU’s role – and its 
role alone – to create coherence in this 
area. Where protecting cyberspace is con-
cerned, member states should not limit 
themselves to avoiding irresponsible solo 
decisions. They must also undertake every-
thing that could reasonably be expected 
from them to contribute along with other 
states to an “open, global, free, peaceful 
and secure cyberspace”. 
There is debate over how far EU govern-
ments should prepare to take technical 
counter-measures or even carry out hack-
backs, as is currently being considered 
in the case of Russia. This would be 
the highest level of escalation under the 
mutual-assistance clause when a Member 
State chooses to invoke self-defence as 
recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter 
and in accordance with international law, 
including humanitarian law. The final step 
of crisis management would then consist of 
stopping an ongoing attack through active 
defence. Ultima ratio would be a so-called 
hackback, meaning the targeted elimina-
tion of the server from which an attack has 
been launched. This only complies with the 
principle of due diligence if the ongoing 
attack has serious consequences that 
threaten a state’s survival and if all other 
means have been exhausted. The legal 
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framework and the distribution of com-
petences this requires have not been 
defined, not even at the national level. 
The EU’s most important and lastingly 
effective tools in this context are prevention 
and detection. Prevention encompasses the 
measures contained in the NIS directive, 
such as the introduction of minimum 
standards and reporting requirements for 
operators of critical infrastructure. Tele-
communications providers are allowed to 
analyse data traffic in case of disturbances 
and, if necessary, block the culprits they 
identify. 
Detection is the elucidation and attribu-
tion of attacks. Here, political evaluation 
is decisive. It has to take into account the 
overall picture of incidents in cyberspace to 
anticipate militarily relevant hybrid threats. 
Where professional attacks are concerned, 
cyber diplomacy between likeminded states 
is necessary for security agencies to be able 
to share analyses of code fragments and of 
the way the attack unfolded. Such analyses 
often make it possible to draw conclusions 
about hacker groups and their origins. 
The CSIRT network and its technical com-
petence is meant to provide a similar ex-
change for Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion. Cyber diplomacy also requires 
authorities and businesses to exchange 
information. Public and private CERT 
groups and alliances in industry are in-
dispensable for pooling expert knowledge 
in cyber diplomacy as well. 
Cyber diplomacy is an important com-
ponent of national cyber security, but it 
also has to integrate the European and even 
global dimension. Investigations based 
exclusively on national information are in-
sufficient. With its Joint EU Diplomatic 
Response Framework of 2017, the EU has 
opted for a non-military cyber-security 
policy. This helps resist the temptation to 
respond to threats in cyberspace immedi-
ately. Instead, the EU privileges political 
measures as part of the CFSP, so as to make 
its mark as a force for peace. This approach 
should be understood as a clear political 
signal by its partners and competitors 
worldwide. 
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